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S U M M A R Y
In the debate on US immigration
reform, a number of legislative
proposals have been introduced.To be
effective, reforms must take into
account the lessons learned from
implementing the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).
This policy brief summarizes these
lessons learned as follows:
• The robust and growing demand for
work and family reunification visas
must be incorporated into new
policies;
• Legalization should not be done
halfway;
• Reducing incentives for fraud should
be a top policy goal; and
• Migration is a complex phenomenon
that cannot be managed unilaterally;
it requires cooperation among
neighboring countries.
The policy brief argues that there 
are three “E”s required to achieve 
stable reform:
• Enforcement that devises smarter
border and interior controls that
are consistent with America’s values,
temperament, and philosophy of
government powers;
• Expanded numbers of visas that
address the continuing demand,
especially from citizens of the
countries on America’s borders; and
• Earned regularization that offers a
realistic and fair opportunity to the
unauthorized resident population in
the United States to earn lawful
permanent status.
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INTRODUCTION
In his far-reaching statement of January 7, 2004, President
George W. Bush returned to one of the earliest themes of his
presidency, and to one of the country’s most intractable poli-
cy and political dilemmas: how to better manage the United
States’ immigration system.  Echoing the refrain of “safe,
orderly, and legal” immigration articulated at his first meet-
ing with Mexico’s President Vicente Fox on February 16,
2001, Mr. Bush acknowledged again that the United States
values and relies on immigrants.  Yet, he argued, because the
immigration system is so broken, “We see millions of hard-
working men and women condemned to fear and insecurity in
a massive, undocumented economy”, in “jobs American citi-
zens are not filling.”  
Mr. Bush’s prescription? A huge temporary worker program
that would “match willing foreign workers with willing
American employers”; be open to currently unauthorized, as
well as new, immigrants; and would roll forward in three year
intervals.  With this proposal, the president jump-started a
stalled national conversation on the role of immigrants in the
US economy and society, and laid out the way forward for
immigration reform.  
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Twenty months later,
the presidential rhet-
oric of 2004 has
remained just that –
rhetoric.  The presi-
dent picked up the
reform talk at the
2005 State of the
Union, and has come
back to it intermit-
tently since then.  In
late spring, the
White House created
expectations once
more with the impan-
eling of another working group, this time a
“principals’ group.”  Rumors that this latest
process would lead to a fleshing out of the
administration’s position by late June/early
July have proved baseless.  Instead, the
administration seems to be moving away from
using its political capital to promote specific
reforms and toward exhorting Congress to act.
In many ways, Congress, or at least the US
Senate, has taken up the immigration reform
cause in the form of two dramatically differ-
ent legislative proposals.
The first was introduced
in May by Senators John
McCain (R-AZ) and
Edward Kennedy (D-
MA), and
Representatives Jim
Kolbe (R-AZ), Jeff Flake
(R-AZ) and Luis
Gutierrez (D-IL).  The
second was introduced
in July by Senators John
Cornyn (R-TX) and Jon
Kyl (R-AZ).  Both bills
attempt to be “compre-
hensive” but offer
sharply contrasting
views on two key elements of reform: how to
treat the unauthorized population, how much
to invest, and how sharply to focus on
enforcement.
The House Republican leadership, on the
other hand, seems to be taking a far more
deliberate route to reform, apparently focusing
on reaching a degree of consensus on key
issues before introducing legislation.  In the
meanwhile, the declaration of states of immi-
gration emergency by the Democratic gover-
nors of New Mexico and Arizona in August
2005 will likely catapult immigration reform
— albeit focusing on border and other immi-
gration control issues first — to the top of the
political agenda as soon as Washington
“opens up for business” again after the Labor
Day holiday.
Describing the immigration system as broken
is fully consistent with the facts: There are
currently close to 11 million unauthorized
immigrants in the country.  Over half of them
live in just four states — California (with
more than a quarter of the total), followed by
Texas, Florida, and New York (see Chart 1).
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Making immigration
changes that are comprehen-
sive and will serve the
national interest will require
the radical reengineering of
a highly technical, over-
tweaked system, built on
outdated ideas and the
inconsistencies of political
expedience, conflicting
impulses, and delicate com-
promises over many decades.
Number of illegally resident immigrants in the United States: 10.3 million. Source: Pew Hispanic Center, 2005
CHART 1
States With the Largest Number of 
Illegally Resident Immigrants, 2002-2004
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Furthermore, about half-a-million
new unauthorized immigrants (the
majority from Mexico) are added
to our economy and society each
year.  They help swell an under-
ground population that is mostly
Mexican, but also includes large
numbers of Central and South
Americans, Asians, and signifi-
cant numbers from the rest of the
world (see Chart 2). 
Making immigration changes that
are comprehensive and will serve
the national interest will require
the radical reengineering of a
highly technical, over-tweaked
system, built on outdated ideas and the incon-
sistencies of political expedience, conflicting
impulses, and delicate compromises over
many decades.  Adding to the challenge,
reform will need to be bipartisan in what is a
highly polarized debate.  No major immigra-
tion legislation has ever become law without a
truly bipartisan effort.  Furthermore, few addi-
tional public resources are likely to be allo-
cated for regulation and enforcement.  Finally,
public attitudes are ambivalent at best
towards both immigration and immigrants.  It
is a daunting task, and one of the most urgent
facing the United States today.  
This policy brief examines and reflects upon
lessons learned from the last major attempt
made in 1986 to resolve the problem of illegal
immigration, and makes recommendations for
immigration policymaking and management. 
Lessons from the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA)
The last time the United States attempted
large-scale immigration reform, the result was
the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) of 1986.  It took a commission of cab-
inet secretaries and members of Congress
three years (1978 to 1981) to settle on the
outlines of reform. Another five years and
dozens of congressional hearings, consulta-
tions, and briefings ensued before IRCA
became law.  In the process, the scope of the
legislation was narrowed and changed in ways
that set the course for its effectiveness.
IRCA’s objective was to address illegal immi-
gration.  It established
a three-pronged
approach to the issue
that its sponsors
dubbed the “three-
legged stool”:   
• It created a process
whereby more than 2.7 million illegally res-
ident foreigners who met a variety of
requirements gained lawful permanent resi-
dence (LPR or “green card”) status.  For
most, the key prerequisite was residence in
the United States for five or more years.  For
agricultural workers, however, ongoing or
3
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From the standpoint of
both human rights and
economic objectives, the
1986 reforms were success-
ful in many ways.
Number of illegally resident immigrants in the United States: 10.3 million. 
Source: Pew Hispanic Center, 2005
CHART 2
Illegally Resident Immigrants in the United States
by Country and Region of Origin, 2004
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recent work in the fruit, veg-
etable, and horticulture indus-
tries was the main requirement
(see Chart 3).  The legalization
process took up to three years to
complete (with different eviden-
tiary standards for different
groups of unauthorized resi-
dents) and ultimately led to
green cards for approximately
90 percent of the applicants.
This represented about half of
the population estimated to be
in the United States illegally at
the time.  Three-quarters of
those legalized were Mexicans;
Central Americans were the next
largest group at 10 percent of
the total (see Charts 4 and 5).
More than half of the legalized
population resided in California,
followed by Texas (with 15 per-
cent), New York, Illinois, and
Florida (see Chart 6).
• IRCA banned the hiring of for-
eigners who did not have work
authorization and established a
graduated scale of civil and
criminal penalties for employers
who broke the rules.  Up to that
time, it had been illegal for a
foreigner to be in the United
States without authorization, but it was not
illegal for an employer to hire an illegally
resident foreigner.  This legislative oddity
went back to 1952 and was known as the
Texas Proviso. 
• The law called for stronger border enforce-
ment, but was not accompanied by signifi-
cant new resources until the mid-1990s.
From the standpoint of both human rights
and economic objectives, the 1986 reforms
were successful in many ways.  Millions of
hard-working, law-abiding people came
“out of the shadows” with no disruption to
the economy.  Two comprehensive govern-
ment reports on the labor market adjust-
ments of the legalized population (based on
a large longitudinal sample taken roughly
two and five years after IRCA) showed that
most assumptions about the beneficial
Source: Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security
CHART 4
Total Number of IRCA Applications Received and
Approved for All Countries, North America, and Mexico
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Source: Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security
CHART 3
Total Number of IRCA Applications Received 
and Approved by Major Legalization Program
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effects of legal status on the life chances of
that population were validated. 
In retrospect, however, the reforms did little 
to right the nation’s regulatory and interior
enforcement or otherwise control future illegal
immigration flows.  Thus, it is important to
draw out the key lessons from this earlier
experience with broad immigration reform 
and legalization. 
Lesson #1:The robust and
growing demand for work
and family reunification
visas must be incorporat-
ed into new policies.
History 
Both the principles and basic
architecture of reform reflected
in IRCA were conceived during
the difficult economic times of
the late 1970s and early 1980s.
This was a period of high unem-
ployment, even higher interest
rates, and a general sense of
malaise — a period in which
the nation’s outlook was largely
defined by limits and fear, rather
than confidence in the future
and optimism about the United
States’ role in it.  
By the time IRCA was enacted
in 1986, however, the economy
had rebounded and national
confidence was running high.
Emerging labor shortages and
skill mismatches, due both to
geography and the shortcoming
of educational and training insti-
tutions, were already becoming
the dominant concerns.  IRCA
was conceived in one era but
enacted in a different one. 
As a result, it failed to address the ongoing
and increasing demand for foreign workers
and additional family reunification visas.
These demands were partly, if inadequately,
addressed in the agricultural area and in sub-
sequent legislation in 1988 and 1990.  How-
ever, the fixes were too little, too late, and
were diluted by too many political compromis-
The total number of IRCA applications received was 3,040,948. The total number of IRCA applications
approved was 2,736,717. Source: Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security.
CHART 6
States With the Largest Number of IRCA
Applications Received and Approved
The total number of IRCA applications approved was 2,736,717.
Source: Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security
CHART 5
Approved IRCA Applications by Area of Origin
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es.  This was especially true in regard to
lower-skilled worker visas, whose numbers
were limited in 1990 to 10,000 per year and
have since been reduced to 5,000.  
No adjustments whatsoever were made to the
visa system in IRCA, except for certain forms
of mostly unskilled temporary labor (the H-2
category).  Legislators instead operated on the
notion that the labor market did not need many
foreign workers and that employers could be
“weaned” from their already “too high”
reliance on unauthorized foreign workers
through the combination of generosity (legaliza-
tion) and tough love (employer sanctions.)  
Few legislators or observers during that era
either foresaw, or were ready to confront, the
growing reliance of many sectors of the econo-
my on immigrant labor.  The role immigrants
were playing in the economy had already
become structural. As such, this dependence
was becoming ever more deeply embedded in
increasing segments of the economy and in the
way American society was organizing itself.
Employer sanctions, IRCA’s principal contri-
bution to immigration enforcement, did not
succeed in reversing the increasingly vora-
cious demand for workers willing to do jobs
that few Americans were eager to do then and
are even more reluctant to do now.    
Penalizing employers for hiring unauthorized
workers is a European — more precisely,
French — policy idea that dates back to the
1930s. It has never worked particularly well
for the Europeans, despite a tradition of gov-
ernment regulation of labor markets; large,
specialized enforcement bureaucracies; and, in
some instances, special administrative courts
to prosecute employers who violate immigra-
tion and labor protection laws.  In fact, in sev-
eral European economies, such as Germany,
despite the aggressive enforcement of employ-
er sanctions, the underground economy has
grown in the last five years at a rate of about
five percent annually, fed in part through ille-
gal immigration.
Strengthened border enforcement was the other
enforcement component of the 1986 law’s pro-
visions for “regaining control” over illegal
immigration.  New enforcement methodologies
and large additional investments on border
controls did not begin to be put in place until
the mid-1990s.  By then, habits of illegal
migration from Mexico had resumed their pre-
1986 patterns, and the increasing demand for
low-skill labor made the task of controlling
illegal immigration through enforcement meas-
ures alone all but impossible.
Reflections 
There are several important lessons from this
experience. One is the need for legislation that
not only addresses current economic needs,
but also anticipates those of the future.  This
may be too tall an order in systems that sepa-
rate executive from legislative functions. The
legislative processes are lengthy and often
result in addressing last season’s problem.
Building some degree of flexibility into the
immigration system, which now has virtually
none, may allow us to react to changing cir-
cumstances with far greater timeliness.  
A second lesson from the 1986 law concerns
the need to evaluate and rethink our willing-
ness and capacity to enforce employer sanc-
tions.  Labor markets are loosely regulated, 
and the workforce is extremely diverse.  A
Northeastern University Center for Labor
Market Studies report estimates that half of all
new workers in the United States in the 1990s
were foreign-born.  Under these circumstances,
can the government do any better than Europe
has done with employer sanctions, even with
significant budgetary increases? Is it possible
to do so without the racial and ethnic discrimi-
nation that is, and must always remain, of con-
6
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cern to Americans? Finally, can the govern-
ment enforce sanctions, when Democratic and
Republican congresses and administrations
have been unwilling to establish the personal
documentation requirements that might give
employer sanctions a chance? 
Lesson #2: Legalization should 
not be done halfway.
History 
IRCA’s approach viewed legalization as an
amnesty — that is, an act of mercy and for-
giveness — which many Americans funda-
mentally oppose. Consequently, the IRCA
legalization debate was about how generous to
be in pardoning lawbreakers.  The current
debate is on a similar path. 
IRCA provided the opportunity to legalize to
those who could demonstrate they had been in
the United States “continuously” since before
January 1, 1982. The authors believed that
the political marketplace could bear no more.
There was little debate about those who would
not qualify for legalization.  
When President Ronald Reagan signed IRCA
in November 1986, the previous five years’
population of illegal arrivals did not qualify.
Yet they had little incentive to leave and the
government had no plan whatsoever for deal-
ing with them.  In fact, employers who contin-
ued to employ illegally resident workers that
they had hired before IRCA came into effect
were exempt from sanctions.  (The workers,
however, were subject to deportation).  IRCA
created several additional exceptions that pro-
tected employers of casual and self-employed
workers from legal responsibility.  While such
provisions reflected the political realities of
the time, the message about enforcement was,
and has continued to be, one of ambivalence.
As a result, some three million unauthorized
immigrants became ever more rooted in com-
munities, continuing to do essential work but
in an unprotected legal environment.  And
they continued to reunify their families legally
or illegally, build new families, and have chil-
dren with American citizenship — becoming
economically integrated and constructing full
lives in a country in which they were not
authorized to live.  The consequences of past
public policy have been that the roots for the
growth of today’s unauthorized population
were left in place. 
Reflections 
Some observers have
concluded that the
answer is tough legis-
lation that closes all
loopholes.  The more
likely path to success,
however, is a combi-
nation of careful
drafting and pragma-
tism that attempts to
learn from prior experience.  Unfortunately,
activists on both sides of this issue have
already reduced the president’s proposals to a
fight over the possibility of another amnesty.
For reform legislation to succeed, it must
avoid setting arbitrary standards for legaliza-
tion simply because amnesty is such a politi-
cally loaded word.
Lesson #3: Reducing incentives for
fraud should be a top policy goal.
History
IRCA’s cut-off date for eligibility for legaliza-
tion required applicants to prove that they had
been in the United States continuously since
before 1982.  The date was set largely to
exclude those attracted to the country by the
protracted and well-publicized congressional
debate over amnesty.  However, the date gave
rise to a thriving document fraud industry, as
the unauthorized tried to document their eligi-
7
Insight
Regularization of status
should be approached not as
an amnesty program, but as
an opportunity to address
what has become a social,
labor, and human rights
issue of the first order; an
issue of economic well-being
and national security.  
Insight (Sept. 05, No 5) 5  9/6/05  10:32 AM  Page 7
bility with proof (including affidavits) from
and about their prior lives.  
Intense post-legislation skirmishes over the
implementation of the law, many involving
legislators on either side of the issue, rein-
forced uncertainty that probably helped con-
tribute to administrative inconsistency in cer-
tain areas, as well as further fraud. Although
the process of writing regulations was remark-
ably open and participatory, the government
held to strict interpretations of the statutory
language on some key issues that led to sever-
al celebrated lawsuits over eligibility; one was
not resolved until early 2004. The govern-
ment lost all such suits.
Reflections 
The 1986 experience with fraud, post-enact-
ment congressional interventions, and admin-
istrative inconsistency demonstrate the need
for an approach to legalization that is flexible,
transparent, and unambiguous.  In particular,
the Congress must be more disciplined as to
how it conducts its post-enactment oversight
responsibilities.  Congressional micromanage-
ment of immigration has reached epidemic
proportions with little to show in terms of bet-
ter policy outcomes. President Bush and the
two Senate bills introduced so far in 2005 set
the cut-off date for eligibility in the recent
past.  This cut-off date would be a repeat of
past mistakes if Congress does not act soon.      
Regularization of status should be approached
not as an amnesty program, but as an opportu-
nity to address what has become a social,
labor, and human rights issue of the first order;
an issue of economic well-being and national
security.  People should not be asked to prove
when they arrived (about two-thirds of illegally
resident persons probably enter the country
without inspection) or for how long they have
worked (many unauthorized immigrants are
likely to work off the books). These screening
methods are so vulnerable to fraud that they
risk appearing to reward illegal immigration.
Instead, unauthorized immigrants should be
asked to earn their new legal status. 
Unauthorized immigrants should be asked to
begin the regularization process by registering
with immigration officials; they should then
be given three or more years in which to qual-
ify as legal permanent residents (LPRs).  This
lays the groundwork for one of the paramount
objectives of the program, a security vetting.
The criteria for regularization should be clear,
and easily verifiable. Above all, they should
reflect that which our society considers impor-
tant and has the right to demand of its immi-
grants, thus strengthening national cohesion.
Demonstrating the ability to be self-support-
ing, be steadily employed, have a clean crimi-
nal record, pay taxes, speak English capably,
and show a measurable commitment to civic
life, can reasonably be required of applicants.
The process should also pay for itself, but in
ways that go beyond the adjudication costs
alone.  Applicants should be asked to help
underwrite the additional social expenditures
their new status will entail — costs that are
currently borne by state and local jurisdic-
tions alone.  One way of paying for such costs
is to require applicants to contribute to a trust
fund that would reimburse state and local gov-
ernments for such expenses in the early years
— a privately-funded effort modeled on the
federally-funded State Legalization Impact
Assistance Grants that followed the 1986
legalization programs.  
The three, or more, year period for transition-
ing to “green card” status and the likelihood
of higher earnings due to the interim legal sta-
tus make requiring a larger fee reasonable.
Sliding fee scales would also make such fees a
8
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fair price for the public goods the legalized
receive.  Together, fee structures along these
lines reassure the American people that the
program is tough but fair.  This is essential for
the public buy-in that can make the difference
between enacting broad legalization or not. It
would also be an invitation for private philan-
thropy to participate.                                       
Lesson #4: Speak unilaterally, if 
necessary, but think and act 
bilaterally and multilaterally.
History 
IRCA was conceived of as a purely domestic
initiative, with little consideration on either
side of the border as to what Mexico and other
countries in the region could bring to the
table.  The debate was thus exclusively about
our “sovereign right” to choose immigrants
and our “duty” to control our borders.  
These are indeed a nation’s prerogatives and
responsibilities.  Much has changed, however,
since the early 1980s.  The facts have demon-
strated that a phenomenon as complex as
migration cannot be well-managed unilateral-
ly.  It requires cooperation among neighbors.
As Phil Gramm, a former Republican senator
from Texas, observed in 2001, when it comes
to unauthorized migration, too many sectors of
American society, including “government at
all levels,” are already deeply “implicated.”
Pragmatism, even humility, is no weakness if
the focus is on the right goal. This precept is
being reinforced every day in the war on terror
and is referred to explicitly in the president’s
2004 Budget Statement regarding the
Department of Homeland Security.  
Furthermore, the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) has created a framework
for cooperation on immigration and opportuni-
ties for joint action that Congress, most ana-
lysts, and key stakeholders on this issue did
not have in their field of vision as they devel-
oped and debated the IRCA legislation.  Nor
were Mexico’s (or many Mexicans’) public
comments at the time particularly helpful or
cooperation-inspiring. As a result, reaching
out to Mexico (or Canada and other countries)
was not a realistic option and few actors gave
it serious consideration.
Reflections 
Today, eleven years after NAFTA and nearly
four years after the September 11 attacks,
there is far greater appreciation of the fact
that homeland security does not start at the
nation’s borders.  Border controls are in fact
more effective the further away they begin
from our physical borders, while the fight
against human and other kinds of  trafficking
stands a much better chance at success when
undertaken in cooperation with like-minded
countries.  Partnerships with Mexico and
Canada can thus be important assets in our
homeland security arsenal.  
In this perspective, one of NAFTA’s principal
contributions has been creating deeper and
broader bilateral relationships between the
United States and Mexico, as well as the
United States and Canada, on matters that go
well beyond trade.  This has set the stage for
far greater cooperation on security, migration,
and other difficult issues.  Whether these
relationships produce what is needed in terms
of domestic security and migration manage-
ment is almost a direct function of how much
effort we are willing to invest and how we
invest it.
Working with the Mexican government in the
political context created by NAFTA can pay
valuable security dividends for the United
States.  It can, for example, lead to agree-
ments whereby Mexico takes an ever more
9
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active role in disrupting smuggling networks
and in controlling access to its territory,
thwarting those seeking to use Mexico as a
transit or staging area for the illegal transport
of people or goods into the United States.  
Dismantling these networks and disrupting
illegal entry and passage routes is not just a
United States priority. The Mexican govern-
ment has made
some progress in
these domains but
receives little pub-
lic credit in the
United States,
while paying a sig-
nificant political price at home. The Mexican
government has a sophisticated appreciation
of the fact that, by undermining the rule of
law and undercutting the government’s credi-
bility, smuggling syndicates and criminal net-
works make Mexico’s own governance aims
more difficult.  Furthermore, Mexico’s limited
policing resources will be less over-extended
if fewer people attempt to use Mexico as a
transit country into the United States.  The
coincidence of policy interests is an opportu-
nity that Mexican leaders seem to appreciate
more than their American counterparts do,
especially many of those in the US Congress.
SOME IMMIGRATION 
REFORM ALTERNATIVES
President Bush is right in seeking to replace
the status quo with a stable new immigration
environment that builds a platform for new
rules and rewards abiding by them.  To be
successful, however, the initiative must incor-
porate a more sophisticated understanding of
the nature of immigration and be more ambi-
tious in its objectives than the president’s
plan appears to be.  Both 2005 Senate bills
try to seed the policy territory the president
has left fallow. 
Advocates on both sides of the immigration
issue have expressed skepticism and outright
opposition to the president’s plan.  Some of
their views are more carefully considered than
others.  There is merit in far more positions on
this issue than advocates on either side have
been willing to acknowledge to date.  Still,
electoral politics explains much of the jockey-
ing between congressional Democrats and
President Bush’s (and some other
Republicans’) proposals on this issue.  Other
voices simply intend to inflame, and they are
succeeding.  
In this policy brief, two of several alternatives
proposed by important political actors are
considered, so as to build the case for compre-
hensive immigration reform.  The first is most
frequently cited by the naysayers and the
extremists within the president’s own party.
The very simplicity of this alternative also
makes it appealing to broad swaths of the
American public.  The second is associated
with the more timid response that serves as
the path of least resistance to many tough
policy and political issues.  
Alternative One:
Enforce the law and remove 
unauthorized immigrants
Anti-immigration activists insist that the law
must be enforced and that the president’s plan
— and the McCain, Kennedy, et al. immigra-
tion reform proposal — would simply reward
lawbreakers and line-jumpers.  Removing as
many unauthorized immigrants as possible
will, they argue, change the direction of the
momentum away from more illegal entries and
stays; attrition will do the rest. This logic is
10
An analysis that has a com-
prehensive understanding of
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tions cannot possibly start and
finish with “enforce the law.”
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deeply flawed in its understanding of the real-
ity of immigration to the United States and
makes erroneous assumptions about a number
of important issues.  Consider, for instance,
our capacity to enforce laws that, on the con-
tinuum of critical national priorities, rank well
below those of national and domestic security,
public safety, or education — although they
may be more or less implicated in most of
these policy domains.  Still, an analysis that
has a comprehensive understanding of nation-
al priorities and limitations cannot possibly
start and finish with “enforce the law.”
However, even if enforcing immigration laws
received far greater budgetary and political
commitments than it does now, there is little in
the experiences of the United States or other
countries that supports the idea that unautho-
rized immigrants will simply leave or that new
ones will not arrive.  Compared to the United
States, the European Union (EU) is a political
space with proportionately much larger, more
centrally coordinated, and better resourced
police and other law enforcement agencies.  In
addition, virtually all EU member states have
national identification cards (and in several
instances even population registers), regularly
demonstrate a strong commitment to labor
market and other forms of regulation, and have
in some ways a less complicated set of atti-
tudes about immigration than our own. Yet ille-
gal immigration in Europe is growing at rates
comparable to our own and the underground
economy is growing even faster.  
As a practical matter, it is unrealistic to imag-
ine removing a significant share of 10 million
people upon whom whole labor markets
depend and whose families are often a mix-
ture of citizen, lawful permanent residents,
and illegally resident members.  Even by
doubling or tripling current removal rates, it
would take decades, assuming no new for-
eign-born arrive or stay illegally, and the
costs would be prohibitive. 
Alternative Two:
Pursue incremental reform
A recurring question has been how much
reform is reasonable to take on at one time. At
first glance, the argument for moving slowly
seems compelling.  The issues are controver-
sial and the technical details of reform diffi-
cult.  The two bills introduced this year
include some imaginative provisions. Yet,
there is little evidence that enough hard
choices have been made to meet the tests of
smart reform.  
McCain/Kennedy focuses more on the human-
itarian challenge at the border and the broad-
er labor market disorder that large-scale
unauthorized immigration breeds.  And it is
better in acknowledging the social and eco-
nomic facts on the ground.  Cornyn/Kyl focus-
es more on the economics of the issue and
tries explicitly to address the enforcement
issues comprehensive reform must confront.  
Do the challenges to reform mean, then, that
there is nothing that can be achieved in the
109th Congress? Put differently, are there any
“baby steps” that can create a path to more
comprehensive reform?   
a. AgJobs. One carefully negotiated piece of
bipartisan legislation has been pending before
the Congress: the Agricultural Job
Opportunity, Benefits, and Security Act, or
AgJobs.  AgJobs would legalize and stabilize
the agricultural workforce in perishable crops
— a workforce that is almost entirely Latino
and three-quarters or more unauthorized —
while providing better protections to all of that
sector’s workers.  It would pursue the first set
of its goals by allowing unauthorized workers
11
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to work legally and begin to earn lawful per-
manent residence if they have worked in per-
ishable crop fields for 100 days in 12 consec-
utive months during the 18 months prior to
the legislation’s enactment (thus targeting the
more experienced workers).  
These newly legal temporary workers would
be able to remain in the United States for up
to three years and take any job.  However,
they would have to perform a minimum of 360
days of agricultural work in the subsequent
six years (and required minimums in the first
three of these six years) before they could
obtain lawful permanent residence. New for-
eign workers would also be able to gain legal
access to this economic sector with fewer pro-
cedural requirements than today.  In return,
work-related benefits, legal protections, and
labor standards throughout the sector (such as
wages, housing/housing allowances, collective
bargaining rights, and, most notably from a
worker protection perspective, a federal pri-
vate right to action and the ability of third
parties to bring complaints to the US
Department of Labor) would also be
enhanced, in many instances dramatically so.
AgJobs would end American agriculture’s long
exceptionalism with regard to immigration
rules, and is a substantial improvement over
the status quo.  It thus meets most criteria
with which reform legislation on immigration
must come to terms.  In addition, its single-
sector focus tackles one of the toughest politi-
cal issues on which comprehensive immigra-
tion reform efforts have always stumbled,
thereby removing it from the fray.  
b. Targeting Adjudication Backlogs.
There is another intermediary step that could
ameliorate the illegal immigration challenge:
clearing the adjudication backlogs in immi-
gration benefits. For years, the government
has been falling further and further behind in
adjudicating immigration benefit applications.
Benefit waiting times have been on a steep
rise since the mid-1990s, but have become
even more acute in the last few years.
Part of the reason for growing backlogs is
legitimate.  The delivery of immigration bene-
fits must be accurate, security considerations
must be satisfied, and the service must be
professional and courteous.  But immigration
benefits must also be delivered in a timely
fashion.  The cost is not just longer waiting
lines and the likely swelling in the unautho-
rized population. The larger cost lies in disre-
spect for the rules — a phenomenon that has
a deeply corrosive effect on the rule of law.
That effect is not unlike that which offends so
many law-abiding Americans when they see
unauthorized immigrants come and/or stay in
the country illegally. 
Department of Homeland Security data make
clear that, until the early 1990s, pending
applications were holding fairly steady both in
absolute numbers (in the low hundreds of
thousands) and relative to completion rates.
So were the numbers of received and complet-
ed applications.  Demand began to grow as
those who received lawful permanent status
under the IRCA of 1986 became eligible for
benefits, primarily as petitioners for their
immediate family members.  Yet, for a period,
the immigration service was more or less able
to keep up with most of the additional demand.  
Things started to fall behind, however, by the
mid-1990s, when the IRCA-fueled demand for
adjudications was combined with a surge in
naturalization petitions. This surge resulted
from what some analysts have characterized as
that period’s “assault on immigrants.” That
“assault” culminated in three pieces of legis-
lation in 1996: the Anti-Terrorism and
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Effective Death Penalty Act, the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act.  Lawful permanent resi-
dents rushed to naturalize as a way of protect-
ing themselves from the effects these bills had
on the rights of non-citizens.
The surge in demand, however, is not the only
variable that accounts for what happened to
adjudications after 1996.  The naturalization
process was reengineered after the political
crisis surrounding the Clinton administration’s
efforts to promote naturalization in 1995 and
1996. This created a sharp drop in comple-
tions that lasted until 1998.  Following this
reengineering, completion rates steadily
increased again until the end of the fiscal year
2002, when, in the painstaking review of all
immigration procedures that the September 11
attacks made necessary, they dropped precipi-
tously once more.  There have been few signs
of recovery from this drop.  
Delays entice some applicants, whose cases
have been pending before immigration
authorities for a long time, to come and stay
in the United States illegally.  Moreover, pro-
tracted delays in naturalization lead many
immediate families of would-be citizens sim-
ply to reunify on their own.  In both
instances, these acts also implicate the
United States petitioners — citizens, lawful
residents, and employers — in an avoidable
pattern of deception and illegality.
The Requirements of
Comprehensive Reform
The essential elements of comprehensive
immigration reform that can get us beyond
the present policy and political quandary are
as follows:
• Encouraging the largest possible number of
unauthorized immigrants to present them-
selves to the authorities so as to vet them
against security screens (in return for an
initially temporary legal status); 
• Creating opportunities for those who are
here illegally to earn permanent legal status
by demonstrating their willingness and abil-
ity to meet tough but fair standards of evi-
dence and conduct;
• Channeling illegal migration into legal and
safe routes and restoring the rule of law;
• Reunifying close family members in a time-
ly manner;
• Meeting employer needs — and critical
national economic growth and competitive-
ness goals — in a timely manner without
sacrificing worker protections; and 
• Restoring faith in our immigration system
and its managers.
Whichever immigration reform legislation is
ultimately enacted will define how the United
States responds to the issue for the next
decade or two, triggering chain reactions that
will exaggerate both successes and failures.
Therefore, legislation must come much closer
than past reforms to being a reform for all sea-
sons, in economic, social, and political terms.
It can approach that goal only by acknowledg-
ing the facts on the ground and making a real
effort to reflect and anticipate realities in our
labor markets, our families, and the world in
which we live.  
First and foremost, reformers must confront
two elements of political realism head on. No
immigration bill can become law without deep
bipartisan support. Doing relatively small
things on immigration will require almost as
much of an investment of political capital as
going for the big prize.  (AgJobs, because it
was crafted over five years of bipartisan nego-
13
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tiations and because it has the blessing of key
constituencies on both sides of the issue, is the
exception to this rule).  These “laws” of immi-
gration law-making reflect both the nature of
the issue and how broken the system is now.  
The requirements of real reform demand politi-
cal courage.  Immigration reform that is com-
prehensive, thoughtful, and smart must:
• Recapture the initiative on immigration from
organized smuggling networks and their
clients, whether employers or families.
Presently, much of our immigration policy is
in the hands of criminals and profiteers.
This makes a mockery of an activity that
defines who we are as a country — and who
we will become — more than anything else
we do. 
• Insist on the rule of law in immigration by
seeking to regulate, rather than deny, critical
facts on the ground.  Laws that reflect reality
and lead to predictable outcomes on a timely
basis will allow us to make better-informed
decisions about immigration and build a
broader national consensus on the issue.
• Reflect unambiguously our values as a people
by choosing legality over illegality, safety over
unnecessary danger, and orderliness over
chaos.  These values, as the president has
said repeatedly, do not stop at our borders.
• Advance our long-term economic interests
while remaining demonstrably consistent
with our short and medium-term ones.  
A stronger national consensus on immigra-
tion is possible only if we can demonstrate
its broad economic benefits every step of 
the way.
• Anticipate the social consequences of eco-
nomically motivated immigration decisions
and address them, both in regard to the
unity and formation of families and in regard
to essential labor standards and protections.
No society can ignore the effects of immigra-
tion policy on its national fabric or labor
market. This makes the host of issues
included in the concept of immigrant inte-
gration a critical area for innovative
public/private thinking and action.
• Meet our domestic and international legal
obligations and allow us to act as good glob-
al citizens.  It must also respect national
budget constraints.  However, cost cannot be
an excuse for implementing only the politi-
cally appealing policing and control initia-
tives, without investing in immigration bene-
fit adjudications and the social and econom-
ic integration of immigrants.
Meeting these requirements will be difficult.
Nor can the effort be left only to the govern-
ment.  Rather, it must be approached in the
spirit of a national project in which all of
America’s voices, but particularly those of civil
society and social institutions, are actively
called upon to participate as full partners in a
common effort toward comprehensive immigra-
tion reform.  In this regard, the legalization
effort of the late 1980s may be a good starting
point for the level and forms of engagement
that will be required of civil society. 
Engaging civil society as full partners is the
very essence of pragmatism.  These institu-
tions, and the spirit of engagement and volun-
teerism that they seed and rely on, will eventu-
ally determine whether or not reform proposals
passed by Congress will have a fair chance to
succeed.  This holds true regardless of whether
we are talking about a new law enforcement
regime, a regularization program that elicits as
close to 100 percent participation of the eligi-
ble population as possible, or a temporary
14
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worker program that meets our labor market
needs while protecting all workers.
The Three “E”s of Stable Reform
The temporary worker visas that President
Bush has repeatedly proposed are necessary
migration management tools, but they are not
nearly a big enough idea on which to anchor a
lasting immigration reform plan.  Such reform
requires coordinated action in three interde-
pendent policy areas: 
1) Preventing future unauthorized immigration
to the fullest extent possible through realis-
tic policies and smart enforcement; 
2) Providing adequate legal means for needed
immigrants to enter the United States by
expanding the number of visas of all types
— permanent and temporary, for families
and for workers; and 
3) Accounting for and offering the opportunity
to the currently illegally resident immigrant
population to earn green cards.
These three policy goals are indivisible if the
policy aim is stability, rather than simply
another bite at reform.  A fully integrated
approach can be seen as a different “three-
legged stool” than in 1986, this time without
being wobbly because its legs are uneven or
likely to topple because a leg is removed. 
Each of the three “E”s of comprehensive
reform — enforcing the immigration laws
effectively, expanding visas, and earning legal
permanent status, is discussed below. 
1. Enforcement:  Stable reform requires
devising smarter border and interior
controls that are consistent with
America’s values, temperament, and
philosophy of government powers.
The nation’s border and port-of-entry immi-
gration enforcement is well on its way to
receiving the level of resources and attention
that it deserves. There are two areas, howev-
er, where more attention and political invest-
ment can become true force multipliers in
protecting our domestic interests.  The first is
developing ever more active cooperation with
Canada and Mexico.  The second requires a
larger immigration management framework
that relieves some of the pressure on border
enforcement (and
boosts our domestic
security) in part by
undercutting the
human smuggling
syndicates that profit
from the chaos of the
immigration system.   
In this regard, the various proposals’ emphasis
on temporary work visas can be helpful in at
least two ways: (a) by giving current and
prospective foreign workers and their employ-
ers a legal entry option; and (b) by jump-
starting the circular (back-and-forth) move-
ment of workers from the region, which has
been lost due to border control policies lead-
ing to the perverse effect of “locking people
in” once they successfully cross into the
United States rather than keeping them out.  
Temporary work visas would be a substantial
improvement over the status quo in three criti-
cal social and human rights areas: (a) reduc-
ing border deaths by making crossings legal;
(b) allowing the unification of the now-legal
workers with their families; and (c) curbing
some of the worst workplace and other abuses
that are byproducts of illegal migration.
There is one policy arena, however, in which
we must also make immense progress — the
magnet of jobs.  This may well be the toughest
component of reform.  Rethinking interior
controls would require nothing less than a
zero-based policy review, especially in regards
15
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to labor market controls.  The United States
has never found anything even approaching
equilibrium for sustained periods of time on
this issue — whether in the area of managing
and allocating resources, preventing discrimi-
nation, protecting civil rights, placing undue
burdens on employers, or enforcing the law.
Interior enforcement must go beyond the job
market.  We also need a new, credible strategy
for broader and more systematic enforcement
of immigration laws.  In that quest, expanded
pathways for legal
migration and
comprehensive
regularization
focused squarely
on national inter-
ests are essential
elements in the
struggle to make
enforcement of
immigration law
more likely to succeed.  But they are not a
substitute for meaningful regulation or smart
enforcement.
2. Expanded Numbers of Visas: Stable
reform requires addressing the continu-
ing demand for visas, especially from
citizens of the countries on our borders.
Visas for workers in our low-wage, low-value
added economic sectors (mostly but not exclu-
sively in service industries) should lead the
way in an expanded visa environment.  Some
of those visas will be temporary; they should,
however, have a tough but fair and clear path
to permanency.  Imaginative financial incen-
tives for return are an excellent idea, but will
not work in many cases. Some workers will
still want to stay and some employers will still
want to keep their most reliable employees.
Both should have a legal means for doing so.
Other work visas should be permanent at the
outset.  These judgments may be politically
complicated, and our data systems will prove
grossly inadequate if certainty about project-
ing demand becomes the regulatory standard.
Basic rules can be devised, however, that can
make these judgments less politically volatile. 
While many more work visas will be needed,
they are but one of the areas that require leg-
islative attention.  Family reunification visas
must also be increased and, at least for a
while, they must be thought of as equal in pri-
ority to work visas.  The United States must
begin to do more to honor the principle of
family unity.  Reducing the benefit adjudica-
tions backlog will also go a long way toward
fulfilling that principle.  Since most of the
cost of adjudications is financed by applica-
tion fees, budgetary considerations should not
be a major obstacle.  Increasing and re-allo-
cating family visas may prove a political quag-
mire, but it is an issue that must be engaged.
Keeping immediate families together or
reuniting them quickly must become a policy
priority above all others, for reasons that are
as much about morality as they are about
smart migration management.
3. Earned Regularization:  Stable
reform requires offering a realistic and
fair opportunity to the unauthorized res-
ident population in the United States to
earn lawful permanent status. 
A registration process — in effect, a census of
the unauthorized — is a necessary first step if
the government is to know better who is
already in the United States.  This is a critical
element of domestic security thinking after
September 11 and has topped both President
Bush’s and the recent bills’ rationales for
immigration reform. Such knowledge will give
the Department of Homeland Security the
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flexibility to deploy limited resources more
effectively. But, for that strategy to succeed, as
close to 100 percent of unauthorized immi-
grants as possible must participate in the reg-
istration program. After all, the best way to
find the proverbial needle in the haystack is
to make the haystack significantly smaller.
This is where less than comprehensive reform
ideas become shortsighted. A program that
leads only to temporary work visas is likely to
fail, at least partly, in both of its key objec-
tives: getting the overwhelming majority of
people to participate at the outset, and moving
people out of the US at the end of the plan’s
time frame. That is because many of today’s
illegally resident immigrants have already
spent years in our country, are married to
legal residents, are parents of citizen children,
and work in jobs that are permanent in every
sense of the word.
For many of these people, anything short of a
real opportunity to obtain lawful permanent
residence is not likely to prove enough of an
incentive to either register or play by the
rules, especially when it comes time to leave
the country.  Most long-term residents who
receive only temporary legal status would
likely drop back out of status after the plan’s
end, rather than return to a place that has not
been their home for more than a decade. And
that assumes they will choose to go through
the security registration in the first place.
CONCLUSION
If comprehensive immigration reform becomes
reality, the shared reward of smarter, fairer,
safer, more orderly, and more productive legal
migration would certainly show ordinary
Americans and foreigners alike that it is pos-
sible to have an immigration system that is
based on reasonable rules and benefits the
country as a whole. More will also be needed
to be done to support immigrant integration
and perceptions of immigrants as both eco-
nomic and community assets.
The national conversation about immigration
reform has begun.  There is still time to craft
legislation that is courageous and disciplined
enough to resist both narrow special interests
and the extremists in the president’s own
party, while building the bipartisan immigra-
tion reform coalition that can make real
reform happen.  And real reform must be com-
prehensive reform that follows an integrated
approach in addressing the issue of those ille-
gally resident immigrants who are already
here; makes family unity possible; anticipates
the future demand for more work visas; devel-
ops credible enforcement policies that are
consistent with our traditions; and targets
behavior that the country finds unacceptable.
Reform must be thoughtful enough not to
repeat the mistakes of the past.  Finally, bold
reforms must create a stable policy platform
that can reap the benefits of full engagement
with the global migration system.
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